Judicial elections in the American states became considerably more complicated with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v White. That ruling extended free speech rights to candidates for judicial office, allowing them the freedom to announce their views on a variety of political and legal issues. Coupled with growing campaign contributions by interest groups and the increasing prevalence of attack ads, state judicial elections now often appear to be little different from ordinary political elections. This has caused many to worry about the legitimacy of elected state courts inasmuch as their perceived impartiality appears to be at risk from campaign activity. The purpose of this article is to investigate those concerns, relying upon an experiment embedded within a representative national survey. Four hypotheses about the effects of campaign activity on institutional legitimacy are investigated, including the hypothesis that courts differ little from legislatures in how they are affected by campaigning. The analysis reveals that campaign activity can indeed detract from institutional legitimacy, but the culprit seems to be campaign contributions, not policy talk or even attack ads. Generally, crossinstitutional differences are found to be minor; the factors affecting judicial legitimacy have similar effects on legislative legitimacy. No support whatsoever is found for the view that the ruling in White threatens the legitimacy of elected state courts.
T he Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White-which extended the first amendment to the U.S. constitution to campaign statements made by candidates for judicial office-has been predicted to ''make a change in judicial election campaigns that will downgrade the pool of candidates for the bench, reduce the willingness of good judges to seek reelection, add to the cynical view that judges are merely 'another group of politicians,' and thus directly hurt state courts and indirectly hurt all our courts'' (Schotland, 2002, 8) . Professor Schotland is certainly not alone in fretting about the consequences of the ''new-style'' of state judicial elections for the perceived legitimacy of law and courts. Indeed, even Justice Sandra Day O'Connor-who voted with the majority in extending free-speech rights to candidates for judicial office-has expressed serious regrets about her deciding vote in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White owing to fears that the campaigning genie has come out of the bottle, with a vengeance (Hirsch 2006) . If these observers are correct that judicial legitimacy is imperiled, this seems a sizable cost to pay for the free speech rights of candidates for state judicial office.
It is puzzling that observers are so certain of the consequences of electioneering on judicial legitimacy given that the scientific evidence on such effects is so scant. Indeed, so far as I am aware, only a single study-conducted in a single state, Kentucky-has investigated the impact of campaign activity on attitudes toward the judiciary (Gibson 2008a ). Although we know a fair amount about the more general origins of attitudes toward courts (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992) , we know practically nothing about whether the activity unleashed by Republican Party of Minnesota v. White will harm elected courts. Obviously, this is an empirical question of considerable importance for both theory and policy.
More generally, scholars in other subfields in political science are re-thinking and re-investigating the question of whether and how campaign activity influences citizens. For instance, the long-standing conventional wisdom has been that the use of negative attack ads drives turnout in ordinary elections down (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995) . Recently, however, Brooks (2006) claims to have undermined that finding. She concludes: ''Ultimately, Americans are more resilient to campaign attacks than many wedded to the normative idea of cleaner campaigning might be inclined to believe'' (Brooks 2006, 693) . Similarly, Geer (2006) actually touts the value of negative advertising and attack ads in his recent comprehensive analysis of advertisements in presidential campaigns. Although scholars of elections rarely consider such ''dependent variables'' as institutional legitimacy (just as they rarely consider judicial elections), we know at a minimum that the effects of campaigning on citizens are not simple, and that they often vary considerably from what many anticipate. 1 The purpose of this article is to carefully consider how campaign activity by judges influences the legitimacy of state courts. Based on a representative national survey conducted in 2007, this analysis uses experimental methods to discern how specific types of campaign behavior shape the legitimacy the public accords state supreme courts.
2 Specifically, I investigate the influence on perceived impartiality of three types of campaign activity: Each of these represents a causal factor in an experimental vignette embedded in the national survey.
3 Because this is a true experiment (with random assignment of respondents to treatments), I am entitled to an uncommon degree of certainty about the causal connections between campaign activity and institutional legitimacy. In addition, the use of a representative national sample allows inferences from this sample to the larger population of Americans.
One of the mistakes that many critics of judicial elections make is the failure to compare elections for judges with elections for other state officials. For example, scholars sometimes argue that people know so little about judges and judicial elections that different methods of selecting judges should be adopted (but see Gibson and Caldeira 2009b) . But the value of cross-institutional analysis is that we also learn that people know little about state legislators and legislatures, even though few calls can be heard for the elimination of legislative elections. Consequently, the experiment reported here manipulates a fourth factor: the institution involved. Half of my respondents were queried about their state supreme court; the other half, about their state legislature. Thus, a distinctive contribution of this analysis is that the effects of campaign activity can be compared across two important political institutions: courts and legislatures. As a preview of the findings, this comparison often fails to conclude that courts are unique institutions with highly fragile legitimacy. In the concluding section of this article, I speculate more broadly about two issues: the expectations and understandings citizens have of their judiciaries and the consequences of these empirical findings for judicial independence and accountability.
The White Decision and Its Aftermath
Many scholars regard the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White as momentous. While ongoing litigation is still attempting to identify whether any limits at all can be placed on the campaign activities of candidates for judicial office (see Hasen 2007) , the White decision unambiguously granted the right to candidates for judicial office to announce their positions on important legal and political issues, including those likely to come before courts in subsequent litigation. nor create the public perception of openmindedness'' (Hasen 2007, 20) . In the final analysis, the majority asserted that if a state decides to hold elections for its judicial offices, then legitimate elections, with all the attendant campaign activity, must be allowed.
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Although not at the center of the arguments in the litigation, the White decision is crucially dependent upon empirical assumptions about how ordinary people form their impressions of courts. The causal process posited by the dissenters on the Court (as well as relevant support for the assertion) goes something like this. Courts, lacking in the powers of the purse and of the sword, must rely heavily on legitimacy to get their decisions accepted and respected by those who disagree with such decisions (see Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005) . The legitimacy of courts is heavily dependent upon perceptions that judges are impartial (see Tyler 2006) .
Perceptions of impartiality are susceptible to short-term factors (e.g., Grosskopf and Mondak 1998) , such as campaign activity by candidates for judicial office. Citizens who hear judges proclaim their positions on important legal and political issues during campaigns will conclude that such judges cannot be impartial in their decision making on the bench (the minority in Republican Party of Minnesota v White). The legitimacy of courts is therefore threatened by policy pronouncements by candidates for judicial office (see Gibson 2008a Gibson , 2008c , and numerous legal scholars -e.g., Schotland 2001).
To many, the consequence of this loss of perceived impartiality and institutional legitimacy are dire:
When judicial decisions are seen as politicized rather than independent, or as done in the service of a special interest group or to advance judges' self-interest rather than in a neutral and independent spirit, the sense of fairness and justice that is the binding force of the Rule of Law becomes exhausted and the system is weakened. Disobedience and avoidance of legal obligations can be expected to rise in direct proportion to declining respect for law. As respect for the fairness of law diminishes, greater government force must be used to ensure obedience (Barnhizer 2001, 371 , footnotes omitted).
These are indeed serious consequences flowing from the ''new-style'' of judicial campaigns.
What does extant research (primarily conducted by political scientists-e.g., Gibson and Caldeira 2009a) reveal about the determinants of the legitimacy of judicial institutions? 6 In particular, do perceptions of campaign activity affect perceptions of courts? Unfortunately, the social science literature on this issue is scarce. We know, for instance, the Supreme Court's highly controversial ruling in Bush v. Gore did not undermine the legitimacy of the institution (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003 ; see also Yates and Whitford 2002 , Kritzer 2001 , Gillman 2001 , and Price and Romantan 2004 ; indeed, it may have even enhanced it (Gibson 2007) . On the other hand, there is some recent evidence that the ad campaigns by interest groups in connection with the nomination of Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court may have damaged the legitimacy of the Court itself (Gibson and Caldeira 2007) . This evidence is persuasive since it is based upon a three-wave panel survey, which means that change in the attitudes of individual citizens could be observed rather than merely inferred.
7 Apparently, the message conveyed by the ads was that the Supreme Court is just like any other political institution, and as such, is not worthy of high esteem. The ads broadcast by friends and foes of Judge Alito seem to have cost the Supreme Court some of its institutional support.
Finally, a study of the attitudes of the residents of Kentucky directly considers the question of whether campaign activity undermines state court legitimacy. In this research, Gibson (2008a) utilized an experimental vignette that exposes the respondents to different types of campaign activities, including policy speech. His analysis indicates that the alarmists are most likely wrong in their concern about judicial legitimacy being threatened. When citizens hear issue-based speech from candidates for judicial office, court legitimacy does not suffer. It seems that many 4 For an excellent collections of essays on various aspects of judicial elections, see Streb et al. 2007. 5 For the purposes of this analysis, I follow Gibson (2008a) in equating perceived impartiality and institutional legitimacy. Both terms were used in the questions associated with the empirical analysis (see below). And conceptually, impartiality is a bedrock of judicial legitimacy, even if legitimacy might be influenced by factors in addition to fair and impartial decision making by judges. The literature on institutional legitimacy is voluminous. For a discussion of legitimacy from the perspective of institutions and political science see Gibson 2008b ; for the political psychology perspective on the concept see Tyler 2006 . For a superb collection of essays on legitimacy, mostly from psychologists, among whom the theory has recently received great currency, see Jost and Major 2001. 7 Panel studies of attitudes toward judicial institutions are as rare as they are important. For one of the few such studies see Hoekstra 2003. Americans (or at least Kentuckians) are not at all uncomfortable when candidates for the bench announce how they feel about the sorts of sociopolitical issues coming before courts these days.
Gibson's research suggests that policy speech during campaigns may not be damaging to institutional legitimacy. However, that research also found that the receipt of campaign contributions can threaten legitimacy. 8 Contributions to candidates for judicial office imply for many a conflict of interest, even a quid pro quo relationship between the donor and the judge, which undermines perceived impartiality and legitimacy.
9 But it is important to note that there is nothing distinctive about the judiciary on this score: Gibson finds that campaign contributions to candidates for the state legislature also imply a conflict of interest and therefore can detract from the legitimacy of legislatures as well.
Finally, the experiment demonstrated that attack ads undermine judicial and legislative legitimacy. The effect is not nearly as great as that of campaign contributions, but citizens exposed to such negative advertisements during campaigns extend less legitimacy to the political and legal institutions involved. 10 Gibson's Kentucky article is limited in at least one very important sense: The data are drawn from a single state. Kentucky uses non-partisan elections to select its judges, and has experienced a moderate degree of politicization of its judicial elections. Left unanswered by Gibson's research is the question of generalizability: Do the empirical results pertain to states using other methods of selecting their judges?
Thus, before too much credence can be placed in that research, it is necessary to determine whether its results apply broadly across the American states, and to determine whether they vary according to systems of judicial selection/retention.
While judicial campaigns have certainly become vastly costlier and more focused on legal and political issues (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2005; Bonneau 2007a) , to date, practically no rigorous evidence has been produced to document the alleged decline in the legitimacy of courts. It is crucial that this question be investigated via rigorous empirical methods. My Legitimacy Experiment does exactly that.
The Legitimacy Experimental Vignette
Experimental vignettes are widely used in political science as a means of investigating citizens attitudes (e.g., Hamilton and Sanders 1992; Gouws 1999, 2001; Gibson 2002; Duch and Palmer 2004) . These short stories contrast with ordinary survey questions in two important senses. First, they are contextualized in the sense that the purpose of the vignette is often to test hypotheses about how specific aspects of politics affect political judgments. In this instance, the context is defined by various types of campaign activities. By building contextual factors into the analysis, greater verisimilitude is often achieved, especially in contrast to the comparatively abstract form of the typical survey question.
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Second, with random assignment of respondents to vignette versions, all of the enormous advantages of experiments can be reaped. For instance, causal inferences acquire uncommon confidence since the proverbial ''all else'' can indeed be considered ''equal.'' Statistical analysis is vastly simplified because the independent variables (the manipulations in the experiment) are typically entirely uncorrelated with each other and with any error terms.
Finally, when embedded in representative national surveys, the frailty most commonly associated 8 See Persily and Lammie (2004) for what is perhaps the definitive study on American attitudes toward campaign contributions. Gibson (2008a) provides an overview of this literature. For recent reviews of campaign spending in state judicial elections see Bonneau 2007a Bonneau , 2007b A growing literature on the effects of campaign contributions on judges' decisions exists. See for example Cann 2002. 10 Extant literature on the consequences of negative campaigns is certainly mixed, although it seems transparently obvious that candidates for political office believe such campaigns are effective (as do the critics of negative advertising). Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995 (and other studies) document a significant drop in voter turnout associated with negative ads (presumably due to ''tuning out'' the electoral process). However, in an important metaanalysis of the research literature, Lau et al. (1999; see also Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007) conclude that negative campaign ads have little effect, although they acknowledge that virtually no research examines the long-term implications of such ads (p. 860), as in the consequences for institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, judicial campaigns have several attributes that may render them different from other campaigns for public office; in particular, because their use is relatively new, they may appear more jarring to citizens than attack ads in ordinary political campaigns.
11 Aronson et al. (1990) distinguish between experimental realism (the content of the experiment being realistic to the subjects so that they take the task seriously) and mundane realism (the similarity of the experimental context and stimuli to events likely to occur in the real world-in short, verisimilitude). This experiment has a great deal of both types of realism, since the issue of campaign activity is salient to the American people (e.g., see Persily and Lammie 2004) .
with experimentation-lack of external validity or the ability to generalize to some larger population-is overcome. With the powerful advantages of enhanced external and internal validity, 12 it is little wonder that survey-based experimentation has become so popular in the social sciences.
The Legitimacy Vignette is derived from four experimental manipulations. In technical terms, the experiment is a 2333332 fully crossed, betweensubjects, factorial design. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of the 36 versions of the story.
The Experimental Manipulations and Hypotheses
In the vignettes, four characteristics of the campaign activity were varied: (1) the institution, (2) campaign contributions, (3) policy pronouncements, and (4) attack ads. Each of these manipulations represents one of the primary hypotheses of this research. The Institution. The story is centered around the campaign activity of a candidate running for reelection to public office. The first manipulation concerned the office the candidate was seeking. One-half of the respondents were told a story about Judge Anderson, a judge seeking re-election to the Supreme Court of the respondent's state. The other half heard about Senator Anderson, a legislator seeking re-election to the Senate of the respondent's state.
13 (See Table 1 for the text of each of the elements of the vignettes). Crossinstitutional analysis such as this is valuable for determining the degree to which judgments of campaign activity are idiosyncratic to different types of political institution.
14 While evidence is accumulating to suggest that courts are not sui generis-for example, Hall (2001 Hall ( , 2007b has shown that judicial elections actually share many characteristics with elections for other political offices 15 -the conventional hypothesis is that campaign contributions, the use of attack ads, and policy pronouncements will all have a disproportionate effect on undermining the legitimacy of judicial institutions. Thus, H1: The overarching hypothesis of the vignette is that the judgments and evaluations of people vary across institutional contexts.
Campaign Contributions. The aspect of campaigning that causes the greatest consternation among election scholars is campaign contributions. To many, contributions to political campaigns seem little more than payments for beneficial policy decisions, and therefore constitute a clear conflict of interest (on conflicts of interest see Stark 2000) . Especially in the context of judicial campaigns, many observers complain bitterly that the receipt of contributions from litigants before the recipient judge has a devastating effect on judicial legitimacy.
The experiment presented to the respondents one of three scenarios regarding campaign contributions: (1) the candidate refused to accept any campaign contributions; (2) contributions from groups with general policy interests were accepted; or (3) contributions from groups with direct business interests before the institution were accepted by the candidate. In the two instances in which the candidate accepts contributions, I have tried to distinguish between groups hoping to shape public policy in general (e.g., unions seeking statutes and court decisions favorable to the interests of working people) and groups seeking specific policy decisions (e.g., tobacco companies involved in specific litigation or that seek so-called tort reform from the legislature to protect them from litigation).
H2: I hypothesize a monotonic relationship between the degree of conflict of interest and institutional legitimacy (with increasing conflict leading to a loss of legitimacy).
Following Gibson (2008a) , I anticipate that the greatest distinction in the impact on institutional legitimacy will be found between the condition of rejecting all contributions and accepting contributions of any sort. Policy Prejudgments. Campaign contributions and the use of attack ads are central features of 12 The distinction between internal and external validity was first made by Campbell (see Cook and Campbell 1979) . 13 Several considerations went into the decision to ask the respondents about their state ''senate.'' (1) My assumption is that it matters little whether the respondents are asked about the upper or lower chamber of the state legislature because most citizens most likely have insufficient information to hold differentiated views toward the two chambers, and I can imagine no basis for the hypothesis that perceptions of campaign activity vary according to the specific legislative institution under consideration. (2) Lower chambers vary considerably in their names; upper chambers are usually called ''senates,'' and even when not, ''senate'' is a word understandable to most Americans. (3) Finally, the names of the state legislatures as a whole vary throughout the American states, so it would have been cumbersome to have to ask about the specific institution. The experiment therefore varied the degree to which the candidates made specific policy pronouncements. In the control condition, no policy statements were asserted. In the two additional manipulations, the candidate expressed his policy views: In one instance, with general statements pronouncing his views on issues like abortion, lawsuit abuse, and the use of the death penalty, and in the other condition, with specific promises to decide these sorts of issues consonant with the preferences of the majority of the people in the state. 16 The general hypothesis is that to the extent policy views are expressed, citizens will judge the candidate to have pre-decided important policy issues, and therefore to be unable to be impartial when making policy decisions after being re-elected to public office. Obviously, 16 The policy commitment was framed in this general fashion so as not to imply the adoption of any particular position that might or might not be attractive to the respondent (and indeed, with the well-known ''false consensus'' effect, the vast majority of people consider their own views to be similar to those of the majority). Additional research on the Kentucky data shows that more direct assertions of a policy position (e.g., ''If elected, I will work to eliminate women's right to have abortions'') have a more detrimental effect on institutional legitimacy than the somewhat amorphous policy commitment expressed in this version of the vignette. See Gibson 2008c. Assertions such as this are currently banned in judicial campaigns, although they are facing a variety of legal challenges.
H3: I hypothesize that the stronger the policy precommitment, the less the judge and the institution will be thought to be impartial and legitimate.
Attack Ads. When judicial elections are described as ''noisier, nastier, and costlier'' (Schotland 2002) , the ''nastier'' bit refers to the increasingly common use of negative ads by candidates for judicial office. Although the conventional wisdom on attack ads is currently being re-written (e.g., Geer 2006), many scholars believe that the legitimacy of institutions is being threatened by the wild allegations one often hears during campaigns (e.g., that a candidate has been ''bought'' by special interests). Consequently:
H4: I hypothesize that the use of attack ads undermines institutional legitimacy.
Verisimilitude and External Validity
As noted above, the elements of the vignette are reported in Table 1 . In the contemporary United States, it is easy to point to judicial campaigns involving virtually all of these activities. For instance, the issue of campaign contributions has figured heavily in judicial races in West Virginia and independent third-party groups have campaigned for and against individual candidates in several states (e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life). In terms of the expression of policy views, the Supreme Court race in Kentucky in 2006 is a nice exemplar; and it is increasingly common (e.g., Alabama and Georgia) for candidates to announce their general ideological positions (e.g., ''I'm a conservative''). The ''if elected, I promise'' portion of the policy expression manipulation has not appeared in judicial campaigns to date, although in questionnaires completed by candidates for judicial office, some have come quite close to making pledges of this sort. Attack ads are increasingly common, as in a recent campaign for the Illinois Supreme Court. Conversely, conventional advertisements have long touted the qualifications of the candidate for judicial office. So in general, the campaign activity depicted in this vignette closely mirrors the reality of contemporary races for state judicial office.
Data and Analytical Framework
This research is based on an experiment embedded within a representative national survey conducted in the summer of 2007. The experiment, with random assignment of respondents to treatment conditions, was included as part of the interviews. Appendix A provides further methodological details. In virtually every respect, this project mirrors the methodology of my Kentucky study. Before turning to the data analysis, a note about my analytical strategy is in order. For the first portion of the hypothesis testing, the judicial analysis is restricted to those respondents living in a state that selects or retains its judges via elections. These respondents comprise 73.3 % of the total sample, and they all have had an opportunity to vote for a candidate for judicial office. In the last part of the analysis, I compare these respondents with people living in states not using elections to select or retain their judges.
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The Dependent Variable
All of the hypotheses of this research predict an effect of campaign activity on the perceived legitimacy of political institutions. Consequently, the dependent variable, measured by a series of questions following the presentation of the vignette to the respondent, concerns whether the office holder is thought to be able to make fair and impartial decisions as a governmental policy maker. The questions asked address both perceptions of the individual candidate/office holder and perceptions of the institution itself. Regarding the former, the respondents were asked whether the office holder ''can serve as a fair and impartial'' judge/senator. Regarding the latter, a question asked whether an institution in which all judges/senators are selected in the same way as Judge/ Senator Anderson is legitimate. Finally, the respondents were asked whether they would accept the decisions the office holder makes as legitimate. The full text of these questions is reported in Appendix B.
The first empirical question to be asked of the vignette data is whether the various versions of the story are associated with different judgments about the impartiality of the officeholder (the winning candidate for judicial/legislative office). For example, within the judicial context, the percentages asserting that Judge Anderson can be fair and impartial range from 25.0 to 95.5 across the 18 versions of the judicial vignette; in the legislative context, the percentages vary from 30.0 to 92.9. Thus, the stories seem to have captured contextual factors that are indeed meaningful to the respondents' perceptions of the institutions.
As I have noted, the experiment employs multiple indicators of the dependent variable, perceptions of the 17 A full set of tables reporting the judicial results for all respondents is available from the author upon request. Since people from states using elections represent three-quarters of the total population it is not surprising that, overall, the full sample results are quite similar to the results from the restricted sample. Cronbach's alpha for the set of items is .79. Thus, the dependent variables for the statistical analysis of the vignette is highly reliable.
For the statistical analysis that follows, I employ a continuous indicator of reactions to the vignette. This variable is a factor score derived from a Common Factor Analysis of the three vignette judgments. For illustrative purposes, however, I report the responses to the specific item about whether the judge/senator can be fair and impartial. In every instance, the illustrative findings strictly parallel the analytical results.
Manipulation Checks
In experimental studies such as this, checks must be implemented to determine the degree to which the respondents accurately comprehended the manipulations. On occasion, manipulations ''fail'' in the sense that they are not understood as they were intended (for a classic example, see Gibson and Gouws 2001) . For the Legitimacy Experiment, Table 2 reports data relevant to checking the effectiveness of the manipulations, based on conventional questions determining whether the respondents heard and understood the attributes of the stories.
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Important methodological and substantive conclusions emerge from the manipulation check analysis. For example, regarding campaign contributions, in the story versions in which contributions were given, most respondents perceived the contributions accurately, and only minor differences exist in perceptions of the vignette according to whether the story depicted a judge or a senator. No doubt reflecting some degree of cynicism, 28.4 % 20 of the respondents told that the judge rejected campaign contributions nonetheless were certain to at least some degree that he in fact received some. The results for the senate version of the vignette are similar (26.5 %). In general, a substantial majority of the respondents seemed to understand the contributions manipulation as it was intended to be understood.
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The same conclusion applies to the policy commitment manipulations: When the candidate was depicted as making policy statements or promises, the respondents were substantially more certain that policy positions were made known (see the means in the ''Made Positions Known'' section of Table 2) . Similarly, based on the ''Made Policy Promises'' check, those told that the candidate made promises are markedly more likely to perceive such promises. In general, most respondents also accurately perceived this manipulation.
Finally, most respondents were able to recall correctly whether attack ads were used in both the judicial and legislative contexts. In general, then, the vignette was a success in the sense that the respondents correctly perceived the various manipulations. The question that remains is whether these factors in fact influenced perceptions of the impartiality and legitimacy of these two political institutions. Table 3 reports the results from the experiment (among those living in states in which judicial elections 18 For the Supreme Court, the first two eigenvalues are 2.10 and .56, respectively, and the first extracted factor accounts for 70.1 % of the common variance. For the State Senate, the eigenvalues are 2.10 and .53, with the first factor accounting for 70.0 % of the common variance.
Analysis
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See Appendix B for the text of the items used to check the manipulations. 20 The dependent variable is continuous. For purposes of illustration only, I have created a categorical variable, dividing the scale at its center point. 21 Measures of the effectiveness of manipulations are never perfect, in part because different elements of the vignette can influence responses to the manipulation check questions. For instance, respondents may be suspicious of the scenario in which no contributions are said to have been received, but in which the candidate used attack ads and made policy promises, and this may account for some of the variance in their responses to the questions checking the campaign contributions manipulation. take place).
22 So as to be able to clearly compare across institutions, I have reported the results separately for judgments of the state court and state legislature.
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Two of the manipulations are represented by three conditions; therefore, two dummy variables are necessary to model the effects of those manipulations. The excluded categories are ''no contributions'' and ''no policy promise.'' The use of attack ads is a dichotomous condition, which of course can be represented by a single dummy variable.
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First consider the impact of campaign contributions on legitimacy. 25 For both the state high court and the legislature, the acceptance of campaign contributions significantly detracts from the legitimacy of the institution. Interestingly, however, for courts, it makes a relatively small difference whether the contributions are from a group interested in general policy (b 5 2.18) or one directly involved in advocating its interests before the institution (b 5 2.27). My original speculation was that contributions from those with immediate self interests involved would be judged much more harshly than from those with only general policy interests, but the judicial vignette provides only marginal support for that hypothesis. In the legislative context, that hypothesis fails to receive any support whatsoever. In general, both institutions suffer when candidates accept campaign contributions, irrespective of the specific motives of the contributors.
When it comes to policy commitments from candidates, the differences across institutions are entirely trivial. For candidates for judicial office, neither expressions of policy views nor even policy promises have any consequences for institutional legitimacy (the significance of the judicial coefficient just barely exceeds the .05 critical value: p 5 .065). The coefficient for policy promises in the legislative context is statistically significant, even if only marginally influential. But to the extent that there is a consequence, policy talk generally increases legitimacy. Perhaps the most certain conclusion here, however, is that policy talk by candidates for judicial office has no negative consequences for the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of state courts of last resort.
So as to better illustrate this lack of relationship, the first section of Figure 1 reports the answers to the simple question of whether the judge can be fair and impartial according to the three experimental conditions on policy talk. The figure strikingly depicts the small differences across the three types of speech. To the extent that any relationship at all in can be found in these data, it is that the widely feared ''promises to decide'' speech is the least harmful type of speech, even if the most conservative statistical conclusion from this figure is that policy talk of any sort does not undermine institutional legitimacy. 22 I have conducted this analysis using OLS so as to be able to make direct comparisons to Gibson's research. Of course, the regression analysis includes all information typically found in analysis of variance (mainly inferential statistics) as well as measures of the degree of association between the variables. For the details of the distributions of the variables, see Table C .1, in Appendix C. 23 The analysis in Table 3 The substantive conclusions from the two forms of analysis are, of course, identical. The only interaction term achieving statistical significance is that for attack ads, for which p 5 .002 24 A thorough investigation of all possible interactive effects in this experiment is difficult because of the small cell sizes associated with the higher order interactions. Regarding the two-way interactions, none is significant in the legislative context. In the judicial version of the experiment, two two-way interactions achieve marginal statistical significance. Under the condition of contributions from litigants with a case before the court, the effect of the use of attack ads is negative, with the legitimacy index declining by .09 points (on the 0 to 1 scale). This stands in contrast to the effect of the use of attack ads in the absence of contributions from litigants: .05. And although the interactive term is only significant at p 5 .053, the expression of policy views in the presence of contributions of litigants drives legitimacy sharply down. These effects are likely unstable (e.g., only 23 respondents evaluated a vignette involving contributions from litigants in combination with the expression of policy views), and not entirely consistent (e.g., I observe an interactive effect with the expression of policy views but not with the more extreme promises to decide version of the vignette), so I do not pursue them further here. Future research may wish to investigate interactions of this sort in more detail. 25 Note that owing to random assignment of respondents to treatment conditions, the independent variables are uncorrelated (and uncorrelated with the equation's error term) and, as a consequence, the estimates of bivariate and multivariate coefficients are the same. When independent variables are uncorrelated with all other causes of a dependent variable, the bivariate equation is not mis-specified.
So as to drive this point home, the second portion of Figure 1 reports the same sort of relationship between campaign contributions and perceived fairness. Here, there can be no ambiguity about the cost for perceived impartiality of campaign contributions. The differences between the two graphs are stark indeed.
Finally, returning to Table 3 , the data indicate that attack ads are harmful to the legitimacy of legislative institutions, but have no effect whatsoever on judicial institutions. This is also a surprising finding in that one might have predicted that attack ads are the stock and trade of ''normal'' politics, but a violation of the norms of gentility among candidates for judicial office. Figure 1 also depicts this total absence of any relationship in the judicial context.
That attack ads subtract from legislative but not judicial legitimacy requires some further thought. One possibility is that the respondents can more easily imagine what the attack ads are like when the vignette is presented in the legislative context. Consequently, the stimulus is Degree of certainty that attack ads were used. In all instances, the response set varies from 1 (not certain at all) to 10 (very certain).
realistic, vivid, and conjures up scurrilous images. In the judicial context, perhaps not all respondents have ever seen a vicious attack ad, and therefore the stimulus in the vignette does not connect to imagery as disturbing as that evoked by the legislative context. Thus, the difference in the effects of such ads may depend upon the experience and memory of the respondent. This speculation is compatible with Gibson's (2008a) finding that attack ads undermined judicial legitimacy in Kentucky. His survey was conducted outside the election season, but after the spring judicial primaries, and in the context of disputes over judicial questionnaires and litigation on the free-speech of candidates for judicial office. That context may have rendered the attack ads more graphic and realistic to the Kentucky respondents. Since I have no means of investigating these speculations, further research on the processes involved is imperative.
In general, the findings of this analysis of national data are not greatly different from the findings Gibson reports based on a Kentucky sample. To summarize: (1) the effect of campaign contributions was found to be more corrosive in Kentucky than in the national sample, even though its effect is substantial and negative in both studies; (2) few differences exist in the consequences of policy pronouncements; and (3) attack ads had a weak negative effect on candidates for judicial office in Kentucky, but none in this national sample.
Sub-National Differences
A national survey of course represents people residing in states using vastly different methods of selecting judges for their high bench, including those living in states that do not ever force judges and candidates for judicial office to face the electorate. To this point, I have only considered those who live in states using elections to select or retain their judges. The data set allows me to assess the degree to which the views of citizens are dependent upon the type of selection/retention system used by the states.
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I therefore created a dichotomy indicating whether supreme court judges in the respondent's state were subject to a vote of the people (partisan elections, non-partisan elections, retention elections), or not (legislative and gubernatorial appointments, and ''Missouri Plan'' appointments without retention elections). To reiterate, nearly three-fourths of the respondents (73.3 %) live in states using elections to select and/or retain their judges.
The most revealing way to model this relationship is to add to the equation shown in Table 3 (above) (1) a dummy variable indicating whether elections are used, and (2) interaction terms between each of the manipulations and the dummy variable (and to analyze all respondents in the sample). The central hypotheses concern whether the effects of campaign activity differ according to whether judges in the respondent's state must face the electorate. The Note: All the independent variables are dichotomies, scored at 0 or 1. The dependent variables also vary from 0 to 1. Standardized regression coefficients (b): ***p , .001; **p , .01; *p , .05.
proper statistical test asks whether the addition of the interaction terms leads to a statistically significant increase in explained variance in institutional legitimacy, and whether any of the sets of interaction terms achieve significance (see Cohen et al. 2003) . The analysis reveals that only two of the interaction terms are statistically significant. Both have to do with the policy talk variables. When these two interaction terms are added to the basic equation, R 2 changes by 1.8 %, which is statistically significant at p , .05. 27 The interaction terms are quite interesting: In states with elected judges, the coefficient for the condition under which the candidate expresses his policy views is a trivial .04. However, in states without elections, the coefficient is 2.24, indicating that policy talk detracts from legitimacy. Similarly, while the coefficient for the policy promises condition is +.11 in states with elections, it is 2.16 in states without elections.
28
From this analysis, an important amendment to the findings reported in Table 3 (above) emerges: The general conclusion that policy statements by judicial candidates have no deleterious effects on institutional legitimacy is confined to states employing elections to select and/or retain their judges. In states without such processes, citizens (presumably) have little direct experience with judicial campaigning and they therefore find it objectionable when they are exposed to such activity in the experiment. For the full results of the interactive regressions, see Table D .1 in Appendix D. 28 Following Benesh (2006, 704) , I also controlled for a number of institutional factors such as level of professionalism, dissent rates, and the rate of the exercise of judicial review (see her footnote 8, p. 700). The addition of these variables to the interactive equation has no effect whatsoever, largely because, as in Benesh's analysis, these variables have no relationship with the dependent variable of this analysis. 29 I have re-run all of this analysis with a more restricted indicator of type of selection/retention system: partisan and non-partisan elections versus all other systems. The results are extremely similar to those reported in Table D .1 and discussed in the text above, with no modifications whatsoever required in the substantive conclusions.
Care must be taken, however, with this finding, for two reasons. First, the sample was, of course, not designed to be representative of individual states, and, second, this interactive effect is not confirmed on the issues of campaign contributions and attack ads. Perhaps this indicates that campaign contributions are ubiquitous and widely disliked, attack ads are also ubiquitous but are seen as part of everyday politics and are therefore widely thought to be acceptable, but policy talk by judges, a relatively new phenomenon even in states electing judges, is still seen by some as inappropriate (or at least unusual) behavior. Thus, people without experience with voting for judges appear to be considerably more offput by policy talk than people living in states selecting their judges by popular elections.
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Discussion and Concluding Comments
The most important findings of this article speak to the question of whether policy talk by candidates for high judicial office undermines perceptions of judicial impartiality and ultimately the legitimacy of courts. If it does, then that is a high price to pay for extending free speech rights to judges. Fortunately, the data are unequivocal: When judges express their policy views during campaigns for elected judgeships, no harm is done to the institutional legitimacy of courts. The data reported in this article strongly disconfirm the fears of the minority in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White-as well as many if not most scholars-that policy talk would threaten judicial legitimacy. Indeed, the data even indicate that policy promises have no untoward effects on court legitimacy. These findings deserve special credence both because they replicate using national data the evidence from an earlier study in Kentucky, and because they are based on an experimental design (which allows a great deal of confidence in the causal inferences).
Of course, it is possible to imagine that more extreme policy talk could in fact threaten court legitimacy. Were a candidate to declare that he or she would decide a certain way in a specific case-in contrast to taking a position on a specific issueperhaps citizens would view that declaration as illegitimate. At present, the evidence indicates that at least some policy commitments and promises do not harm courts; we do not know the point at which such talk ''crosses the line'' of acceptability, if it does, and thereby generates the appearance of partiality. Future research ought to consider this question more thoroughly (see Gibson 2008c) .
At the same time, the current system of campaign contributions does appear to be injurious to courts. Two aspects of this finding are important. First, it pertains with equal force to courts and legislatures. Little seems to be peculiar about the judiciary. Second, only a small difference is observed between the effects of campaign contributions from those with direct business before the institution and those with more general interests in influencing policy.
This finding is worrisome from the point-of-view of democratic theory, and is, of course, contrary to the hypothesis undergirding this portion of the experiment. One can easily imagine a system of mandatory recusal for cases in which campaign contributors are litigating before a judge who is the beneficiary of their contributions. But the American people seem to make minor distinctions between specific conflicts of interests in individual cases and more general efforts to shape public policy by getting the ''right'' people on the bench and in the legislature. The current system of campaign contributions seems to have such a thoroughly disreputable reputation that Americans are unable to distinguish between relatively benign and relatively corrosive types of contributions and influence. I do not want to over-sell this finding since it is based on only a moderate statistical relationship. Nonetheless, future research should explore whether there are any means of contributing to the campaigns of candidates for public office that would not impugn the integrity of American political institutions.
If these findings indicate that scholars must worry about campaign contributions, they do not seem to mandate a similar need for concern about so-called attack ads, at least in the judicial context. When attack ads are used in judicial campaigns, few consequences for institutional legitimacy materialize. This is not so for legislative institutions. While the explanation of this finding is not obvious, it seems possible that legislatures have a lesser supply of legitimacy in the first place, and therefore attack ads enhance a preexisting propensity to view legislative institutions negatively. Courts, on the other hand, have a deeper reservoir of goodwill, which may provide a prophylactic against unseemly actions such as attacking one's opponents (see Gibson and Caldeira 2007 )-even if that reservoir is not sufficiently deep to shield against the perceived conflicts of interest associated with campaign contributions. And as citizens become more widely exposed to extreme judicial attack ads perhaps they will wind up judging them as harshly as comparable ads for legislative candidates are currently judged.
There are, of course, some important limitations to these findings. Most significant, this experiment is based on reading respondents statements about ads, which is a relatively tepid presentation of the genre. Were the experiment to expose the respondents to actual attack ads-many of which are extraordinarily gruff, at least from the conventional standards of judicial advertisements-perhaps the effect would be stronger. Like policy talk, a threshold may well exist at a more extreme point than is portrayed in this experiment. Future research should do more to try to identify and delineate that threshold, if indeed one exists.
I should also note that numerous types of dicey campaign activities are not represented in this experiment. As Hasen has expertly demonstrated (2007), issues such as the appropriateness of direct solicitation of campaign contributions from parties with business pending before courts remains to be decided by ongoing litigation. We also know little about the effects of involvement in partisan political activity (e.g., making campaign contributions to the campaigns of other elected officials). ''Partisan'' is not a word that is endearing to most Americans; whether judges can (and should) act as partisans in their offthe-bench behavior without harming the legitimacy of the judiciary is at present unclear. Indeed, much more research is needed for us to understand the processes by which ordinary citizens draw conclusions about the partiality or impartiality of their judges. Surely, activities other than campaigning matter as well.
As I have noted, the analysis suggests some important differences between states using elections to select and retain their judges and those that do not. Given the limitations of the survey design, these findings must be regarded as tentative, especially as concerns the non-elected states. Future research must pay considerably more attention to inter-state differences, and in particular differences across states in the perceptions and expectations citizens hold of their judges. As costly as it will be, this objective can only be accomplished through samples that are representative of individual state populations. When it comes to judicial politics, states are the important units of analysis, and future research must recognize and capitalize on this basic fact of American politics.
Nonetheless, these findings may indicate that experience with campaigning leads to acceptance of it. Politicized judicial campaigns may provide a ''shock'' to an electorate, but that shock may not have enduring consequences as citizens alter their expectations of proper behavior for candidates. The perceived legitimacy of institutions may be more resilient than is sometimes assumed. The process of learning from the electoral environment is undoubtedly interactive and non-recursive, and only through dynamic research designs can we come to understand better the processes by which citizens update their attitudes and expectations toward political institutions.
The system of electing judges typically stimulates fierce ideological debate. Should judges in the U.S. be more independent or be more accountable? One's position on this issue often boils down to whether one is more sympathetic to the needs of majorities or minorities. As the well-known ''false consensus'' effect has repeatedly demonstrated, most people think of themselves as part of the majority. Consequently, it is not surprising that most Americans tilt toward the accountability end of this continuum. The logic might go something like this:
(1) Inevitably, supreme court judges are exercising discretion in deciding cases and making public policy.
(2) In making decisions, judges cannot but rely upon their own political and ideological values. (3) In a democratic political system, these value-based decisions should comport with the will of the majority. (4) For the majority to get its way on many (if not most) issues of public policy is not necessarily to trample upon the ''inalienable'' rights of the minority.
If in fact judges are making decisions with no technically or legally ''correct'' answer (is the death penalty cruel and/or unusual?), then judges must side with the values of the majority or the minority. Obviously, in a democracy, minorities cannot expect to control public policy on all issues of the day. Where one draws the line may be subject to some debate-the voting rights of minorities, for example, should be not limited by the majority-but, in a democracy, many if not most ordinary public policy disputes ought to be resolved in favor of the preferences of the majority.
Such an argument may have a rebuttal, but I suspect the elemental logic of this position is attractive to many, if not most, Americans. If so, it follows that voters in judicial elections have the right to query candidates about their policy views on important socio-legal issues likely to come before the high court. In terms of the independence-accountability continuum, I suspect that most Americans favor getting more accountability from their judges rather than giving the judiciary more independence.
Ultimately, the majority in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White was probably correct about at least one thing: If elections are employed as a means of selecting judges, then the elections must be legitimate, and all campaign activity that is allowed in elections for other offices must be tolerated in judicial elections. Critics complain that it is nearly impossible to do away with elected selection/retention systems because most Americans favor such processes for selecting their judges. Perhaps this is so. But to restrict policy talk among candidates for public office seems to strike at the very essence of elections as a means of selecting policy makers in a democratic polity. And instead of merely stipulating various undesirable consequences of judicial elections, researchers ought to be more focused on conducting rigorous research on the crucial empirical issues that undergird current policies governing systems of electing judges. Answering these empirical questions will not only contribute significantly to public policy debates over methods of selecting judges, but will also greatly enrich and expand extant theories of judicial legitimacy and of the consequences of the politicization of campaigns for judicial office. 
